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In this t<~xt the Hwk1ut cnsts cau~ed hy the .-ol l np~..- vf the Yugoslav f'cd-
emuun is annly~ed in the inrrrnnrional context. The author inquire.~ inro rhe 
cau~c~ oi the dissolution or Yugoslnvia1 \\hich a.s well demo~tralcu Lbc tTisis 
l>f the European union (CU). The h:t.~t!> for both d.:vclopmcntS ~ the end nf 
Cold wac. aJLhounh Yugosla,iun dismtcgruuon also stem.~ from additional inter· 
nal factor.. "'ludl have been present from rhe YCIV bt:ginnuut ot lthls state in 
!\IllS. The dlaj!llosi.c; is th:ll the belplc~u~ and diScord among Fuml_lt"an oouu 
trit.<> \is-a-\oi~ the Balkan "'ar comes. paradoxicallv, from the 1.'.\t.~ ut pay,;:r in 
the Eu, wbtcb Ill not adequatelv ag{!lc!alt:d and ~ublceted to a !>in~e cnm 
mand. The authnr conclude:. that tbe future outcome or rhe Ralkau war wtll be 
ttltim:Hely deu:!"'mncd by int.:rests and murual reluttuns of the supcrpowet'l> 
USA and Russta. 
lf we read the articles in the politicul m<tgazines nowadays on Balkan 
crisis, an average reader can not but notice how on~ 'idcrl they are. 
However, it would not be justified to claim that the authors of tbo e ar~ 
tide.• .. arc not reputable experts in the international relation. and interna-
tional politics. Why i!oo that so? It is quite obviou!oo that the abstract poli-
tics of the leading superpowers such as the United Stares and Ru. !.iu do 
not allow us to assess all the details of rhe situation on tiH.: ground. Any 
theore tician of war a11J pc;we can not find any rc:lalionship between such 
an abstract policy of power and the enomanss human suffering taking 
plat.:e on the ground. This is the rca'ton why they examiue the -.ituation 
neglecting the local condition' and the effects of hiMnric.tl continuity on 
the ground. Ln their analyses of political ilm.11iun they apply the methoc.l-
olngy of dealing with problems in completely abstract relations of powers. 
as if they are talking about physics rather than politics. 1 bose experts 
tend to unalyse the situation as if they were observing the ship engine 
which is not working, nnl showing the slightest interest in the develop-
ment of ship-building industry from the sailing hoats to nuclear-powt:rc.d 
modern boat , nor do they pay any attention to the disposition of the 
passengers or the crew. Tht: only thing that matters io; to repair the ma-
chine, and all otht:r aspects are of no importance at all. These experL-. 
behave very similarly to navigation instructors who continue lecturing in 
c;pife of the fact that lhe ~hip is already sinking. Of course, european ex~ 
peru on navigation write 'turies full of stoicism becau.<.c they are con~ 
vinced that the sinking ship called South Ea..\lcm Europe is full of luna~ 
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tics, whereas another ship calJecl Europe;m Union continues with it~ plain 
sailing. 
These l:heorl!Licians of the enom10us gap between the abstract politics 
of 1\uperpowers and the situation in the South Eastern Europe have not 
learned anything from Hannah ArendL \\ho. \\Uhout any wish to medialt! 
between thc.'c two extremes, knew how to define the term of ··empty 
space" which lies betwee11 the abstract politics of power and the real 
situation on the ~:,rround. Commenting on the case of Vietnam, rn her 
treatise Polr'tics aJJd lie, she dc::fines the character of abstract power as 
follows: "H ow could 'uch politics have been initiated in the ti rst place, 
and how come it has been pursued until the bm er end'? Leaving the real-
ity und solvmg the problem w~• a desirable course of action, smcre ne-
glecting the reality has always been inherent to uch a policy and uL<, ob-
jective..-.. ( ... ) Moreover, how can we explain the fact that the re was inter-
est to achieve something o substantial as victory, since this has no t been 
a war for gaining te rritory, not evt:n the one lead in o rde r to achieve 
eoonomic prosperity. This war has not certainJy been lead in order to 
help the aUy or Lu fulfill a certain task, nnl even for tbe real power, hut 
for the pure image of power.''! 
Image or fiction of power i exactly the abstr.tL'f. impersonal and emo-
tionless quality nf the policy ot superpowers. The people on the ground 
are aware of it; they have urH.ler!:,'tlne serious physical suffering which the 
theoreticians of the international relations an: not capable of undt:rsl.and-
ing. From the very beginning they have acted as those who :-~re offering 
solution to ibe problem, ant! have been convinced that there is a possibil-
ity of solvmg such an cxistenual problem a-; a mortal combat by passing 
various documents and maps. Po liLiCl.ll science research has reached such 
dimcn'>ions that we had rather quoted AI Capone Lban any of over- in-
formed political ~cicntists. "We could achieve much more hy means of 
using kind words and a gun than hy nice words ouJy." 
Therefore 1 would like to quote severa l opiuions of renowned authors 
who have tried to solve the Ualkao puzz.lc. A certain Misba Glenny wrote 
the following in ForeJ.l!Il: Affair.\J. : "The growing catalogue of failures, 
however, did not deter the United States fwm stepping up its interest 
and diplomatic activity in the area. Vice president Gore hecame the chief 
spon<>or of the Washington accords, signed in March 199-', which envis:.tged 
a federation of Bmnian Muslim and Croats and a confetler:-~tion o f this 
new Bosnian entity and Croatia. FoUowing the Washington accords, the 
Croatian government a~rrced to lease part of the Adria tic island of Brat 
to the US military, which established an intelligence-ga thering center there. 
The ncconls further increased the influence of Pt!tcr Galb raith, the US 
Hanah Arendt, Lug~ in der Polilik. 
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ambassador to Zagreb, who became the key architect of a plan to reinte-
grate the rebel areas now controlled by separatist Croatjan Serb into 
Croatia proper. The plan would give the half miJJion Croatian Serbs far 
more autonomy than they heJd before the war in exchange for the rein-
tegration of the tenitorie.o;; they now bold - roughly 27 percent of the 
country's area. Throughout 1994, many commentators considered Galbraitbs 
sLatements 011 llomcs lie Croatian politics HS aulhorita live as lhose of 
President Franjo Tudman. D espite universal criticism, the White House 
clearly bad no intention of running away from Balkan politics with its tail 
hetween its legs". 
Stanley R. Sloan writes tbe fol lowing in the lnternatjonal /lffajrs: 'The 
en largement Ut:hHlt: WiL'\ HI. Jt:HSt lcmporHrily displaced (rum lop billing 00 
the NATO agenda late in 1994 by the controve.rsy over who w::~s to 
b lame for the Bosnia disaster. If NATO cannot deal with problems like 
Bosnia, some commentators observed, what is it good for? ( ... ) The Bos-
cia crisis has once again emphasized that no organization of sovereign 
states can function any more effectively than the wnscnsus among its 
members permits. If neither the United States nor European allies know 
what values of iJ1terests they are willing to defend, no bureaucratic ar-
rangements will imlucc com;crteu ;u.:tinn."3 One commentator writes the 
fo llowing in Foreign Policy "What bas gone wrong'? 1 believe our concept 
of heedom has changed. In the Second World War, fret:dom was pro-
moted as an iuea Lhal we wen:: really to fight and sacrifice for. And the 
idea as it was then conceived involved freedom not only in our country, 
but also in those where totalitarianism reigned. ( ... ) But &rrauually that 
iuca faueu and another one emerged. This idea explicitly rejected the 
pursuit of freedom as a valid objective of foreign policy. This iJea was 
'realism', whjch maintaineJ that slates o ught to pursue their own self-in-
terest as determined by their geopolitical situation and accord moral or 
ethical considerations only a secondary role. Such wnsiuerations can he 
useful for propaganda purposes - for mobilizing public opinion at home 
or ahroau - but you c.:'ln get into a lot of trouble if you actually believe 
your own propaganda."4 Werner Weideufeld wrote in lnlt:muliona/ Politik 
the foiJowing: "Europe - superpower? At 6rst it sounds paradoxicaJ. 
Europe is proving to be tragically helpJess, but tbe question of its leading 
role on the European continent is still topical. As far a.'\ the sitl1ation in 
the Balkan is concerncu, European Uruon has proved to be its own cari-
cature, whereas its attitude towards the Caucasus proves to he irn:lcvanl 
in preventing tl1e aggression that should have been condemned a long 
Lime ago. ".'i 
1 Iutematiunal Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2, April 1YtJ5, p. 225-229. 
4 Foreign Po&y, Spring 1995, p. 7 L 
5 Werner Weideofeld, ''Europa - Weltmad1l Lrn Wcn.lco", in: Jntcrnil.tionalc 
Politik, No 5, 1995, p. 17. 
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NJ these and many other commentators on political documents and 
pol it ic.tl processes an: ;~ware of ouc f<lCt only - interests of the::ir own 
Realpolitik. There is nothing bad about it from the point of view of de-
veloped p<1litical science, except for tbl! fact that it il> openly admiuing 
that political pro~sses are really something completely different and for 
such a theory absolutely enigmatic. The Balkan crisis cannot be solved 
either theoretically or politically - it will be solved either by war or by 
means of poliLiC<tl agreement. This is actuaJiy fhe moral or the quoted 
articles, hut obviously the <t uthors are nut trying to advertise this. The) 
cou:-.ider themselves <Ill important ractor of this process. They keep offer-
ing their analyses as suggestions for the po-.sible course of action. Both 
the politicians and the generals should know how to cope with such sug-
gc..'>tions - they simply have to he able to make a clear di. tinction be-
tween theoretical drafts ami assessments or rhe political situation on nne 
band, and the real war and politic." on the other hand. That difference 
can nor be ignored - all it can do is offer differem poS~>ibil ities of 
leading war and politics, and emphasize uiffer~m forms of peace. 
Our objective is to fmd the rl!lll reasons for the helplt!ssnl!ss Europe 
has shown rt:gt~rding wars on lhe .European continent a. wciJ as the rt:al· 
life situalion wb.ich Lhc leading fon."Cs such as USA and Ru~ ia (<til to 
'\t:c, or per hap. ju"t do not wan I to see. If 1 he facts are not in line with 
the semantics of power, so much tht: worse for the facts! Neverllt t! less, 
we have to asses Croatian situation in relation to this abstract power 
which is tempting us in order 10 establish v. hether her power can om c-
how help theirs. The fact that Croatia does not have any oil i. not of 
any importance; if she has relevant power in the area, sht: will be re-
'lpected from the superpowers and thus gc•in additional power. Here it 
would be appropriate tu paraphrase Kennedy's favmrrire syntagm: " Do not 
ask yourself how much the Western powers can help Croatia, but ask 
yourself how much help Croatia can give to Western powers, and thereby 
she wiJI ga.in their appreciation reg<~rding her vital inte rests. Croatia has, 
via facti, learned this lruon - she speaks It:.'!'. and less ahmst herself ami 
more and more about the interests of her allies. Thj~ craftiness is hy no 
means without foum.lation: pragmatic ordinance is being surpassed by 
prat,rmatic ordinanct! or it is bl!ing is,.mored with the im.:orrect belief that 
nowadays one can exist alone. without any allie . European Union has 
failed to act politically as pouvnir constituent~ and United States aou 
Russia witnessed this wealcne."". The maximum that ba" heen achieved so 
fa r were several flights of Gem1an and Italian j~;t-planes in several mili-
tary missions, but this was not u result of their own dt:Lcrmination, but 
rather the pragmatic approach of the United States. 
European helple. sncss in dealing with tht: Balkan cris is has been 
caus~.: tl, as H ermann HeUer put it6 , by excess of tht: po litica l pnwer of 
" Carl Schmitt., Politischc Theologic, Dunker uud Hu mblol. Be1 lin, 1 97~. p. 11. 
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European Union which nobody controls neither politically nor organiza-
tionally. The polltical course of action European Union has pursued, has 
not been blocked by past experience or "spirit of history", as claimed in 
unison by both German and Frcm.:h politicians, in order to justify their 
hesitation. ln short, European excess of power is not under direct com-
mand of a certain political organization or a common constitution, i.e. 
European political powers do not understand lhe semanti c..'> of the power 
they have. In short, European powers do not make good use of their 
own power, they fail to find way:-: to pnlitically homogenize their willing-
ness to act, which is, according to Carl Schmitt, original sin of the liheml 
democr~:tt ic foreign policy. Such a policy has proved to be afraid of its 
own power. European Union bas not fa iled in il s pnlicy towards the 
Balkan crisis because it is powerless, but because it has not used or does 
not want to use this huge political powt!r it has. It seems tlwt Europe is 
afraid of itself! 
According tn Carl Schmitt, the failure of present European Union to 
do something about the Balkan crisis cou ld he compared to Lht: failure of 
the League of Nations. The League of Nations was, like the present 
Eurupel-tn Union, a very unstt!ady union of cnllntries, based on the unreli-
able slogan: pacta sw1t servaada. 
The strict prindplcs of liberal-democratic method of solving conflicts in 
a peaceful way prevent the direct milit<1ry intervention in the dog-fight 
war. Many post World War 11 experiences from the crises that have al-
ready broken nut in a number of cowHries ( Czech Republk, Hungruy, 
Poland, German Democratic Republic) are the reason why Europe is 
against di.rect military intervention. 1\11 the above mentioned crises were 
solved hy means of applying secondary means. Even the end nf the Cold 
war is claimed to have been a triumph of the appbcation of secondary 
means/methods. Suddenly, however, those secondruy means that have been 
praised so much, do not seem to work anymore. The rettson why it is so 
lies in the fact that they are not under the unite.d command of tacit po-
litit:al const!nsus of the European countries and the United States of 
America. It was taken for granted that the C.old war bad been won. 
humediately after that it became obvious that the politica l means applied 
to win tire Cold war are not available any longer. Instead of consistent 
application of the secondary means to block the wa1· tota lly and immedi-
ately, it was obvious that there was a lack of political unity to act, even 
to carry out lhe Maastricht abrreemenLJ.;. Actx1rcHng to most analysts, the 
European Union onc.e again became a victim of its old antagonisms. 
Needless to say, we have to understand this sad attitude, because if we 
fail to understand it, every future Eumpean policy wi ll he huilt on sand. 
lt soon became obvious that the Yugoslav crisis is at the same time a 
crisis of the European political union. This fatal parallt!Jjsm is bast!d nn 
historical facts, and the leading powers have to take this into considera-
tion when dealing wilh the problems on tl1e European continent. Euro-
pean political identity is completely different from the American and Rus-
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sian. Yugoslavia, as well as burope, was never organi1ed as a democratic 
constitutional sta l ~. PoUtical unity, as the basic prerequisite condition of 
the stale soverei1!Jity il> something that both Yugoslavia and Eumpt: 
lackcu. In Europe thio; lack of unity was compensated by external threat 
from the Sovie1 Union and the external palronage of the United States. 
The very same lack or poHticaJ and democratic unity w<ts made up fur in 
Yugoslavia not only by external factors, but Hlso by various ideological 
substitutes uf unity \\hich were advocated <~nd carried out by various suh-
jecllt of dicutorship. Political power in Yugosla\ria w<t" not the wiiJ of the 
people nor the God's will, it was imposed from outside and expressed in 
the agreements reached by the leading world powers in Versailles and 
Yalta rreaties, anti from inside hy to tally blurred ideas of the common 
pre-historical origin of nations it consisted of. However, these foundation!\ 
were not strong enough to guarantcc the democnllic stability of the state. 
Instead of democratic legitimacy of the governments, various subjects of 
dictatorship uffered ideological substitute:.. One of the lirsl ideological sub-
stitute~ of democratic legitimacy wac; the idea of the.: common Slavic o rigin 
uf the peoples uf Yugoslavia, <tnd later predominance of the Serbs com-
bined with the idea of Great Serbia. After the World War LI, therc was 
a period of dictaturshjp of prolc.:t:triat internationalism, followed by the 
dictatorship uf the proletariat as a tram,muionaJ identity, and finally by 
self- management of lhe worker a<, u euphemistic -;ubstitute for civil soci-
ety.7 
ln its final phase. Yugoslavia Wa! a peculiar mixture of civil society 
wilJHmt the independent middle class, and at lhe same time a political 
state without any democratic legitimacy of power. Simultaneously it was 
blurred hy pluralism of national identities. Fo llowing Tito's death, foreign 
and home pressures subsided, hut it was only then that all the desinte -
grative powt:r of national identities bec.1me totally obvious and visible. 
Yugoslavia entered the process of t.h!mocratization which comprised whole 
Ea-;tcrn Europe wilhout a crucial prerequisite for this process, i.e. without 
a homogenoul> political nation. Its destruction was thus inevitable. 
The situation wa., rather complicated becau e of the three different 
processes which could not hHve been tcmporaUy synchronized, or chan-
neled in a peaceful way. Firstly, the process of dc.sintegration of the fed-
eration, econdly the decay of L'tnnmunislll, and thirdly, the influence of 
the end of Cnld war on the geo-poJjtical area of Yugoslavia. Since those 
three diffurent political processes could not bnve hcen neither coordinated 
nor .synchronized, the war broke out, marking the end of political stability 
supported by buge geo-political blocks ahroad, and from within by military 
and police repression. 
1 Zvonko Posavcc, "Sh\'aeaoje dcmokracijc u nuvilku Jugos.lavijc 1918-1980"', 
Palititka misao, No 4, 1992, p. 15 
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The end of the Cold war was onlv one of tht: rt:a~ons why this crisis 
was radicalized. T he Cold war had" its own logic and structure, and 
Yugoslavia bad little impact on it. These structures enabled the control of 
the political, economic, cultural, technic<1l, turistic, sport and o ther influ-
ences, and moreover, they managed to keep them at the desirable level 
through inlt:rnalional Lrealit:s. TL was the role of politicians Ln Lake cart: 
of the subtle game of dozing the permeability of this membrane between 
the East and the West. A special culture of imposing embargo on certain 
goods, informati.on or people was introduced, and, of course, a cu lture of 
breaking these embargoes as well. That idyllic time which produced thou-
sands of experts on the issues of Lht: East antl the West is lung gone 
and forgotten. The emerging spirit of the Eastern civil society an imated 
by the Western propaganda on human rights have reached the level of 
unexpected danger for hoth the parties concerned. 
The West is facing the questi.oo whether to open the door to the 
Eastern markt:l economy. If that tlnor is to he open, the West will have 
to face the danger of millions of people of different cultures and differ-
ent life styles. Both the West and the East are facing the question how 
to control those proct:sses as wt:ll as the possihle migration of the peo-
ples from the East towards the West in search for jeans and Coca-Cola. 
The existing economic, political and militaty structurt:s of tin: Wt:sl which 
devdopetl during the Cold w<tr have to restructure urgently if they are to 
accept this new challenge. The question is whether those institutions are 
capable of introducing those changes or Lht:y will simply disintehrrate and 
cease to exist. There is no doubt that the main Russia's objective is disin-
tegration of the NATO and European Union, since this would be the ex-
pected auJ plannt:tl compensation fur the Eastern block which had already 
disappeared. Does not it mean at the same time that the planned Euro-
pean Union, which many people had dreamed of, could he endangered? 
Disintt:gralion of the former Eastern economic and political block was the 
c:mse why the Western treaties and alliences have been on the decline. 
Each country now Jives under the heavy burden of its own historicaJ ex-
periences. The English and the French are again frightened of the Rus-
sian-German alliance, most of all in the Balkans. The lack of unity in 
defining European interests in the Balkan war as well as the attempts to 
draw in even the Russian army in the conflict speaks for itself about the 
huge confusion in the beads of those enthusiasts who conceive the end of 
the Cold war as a sacrosant:t dogma. New structures have emerged from 
the rubble of the Cold war structures, and there is a question that still 
remains to be answered: Is hberaJ democracy, like capita lism, capable of 
intruding itself upon lht: world as the basic political structure of Europe 
and the rest of the world?!! ls capitalism capable of destroying the spiri-
ll At the symposium which was held i.o Zagreb i.o 1992, many theoreticians 
such as Buchhcim, Jahn, Ltibbc, Wcede, Kielmansegg and others expressecl their 
doubts regarding possibility of applying liberal-democratic system worluwidt:. St:t: 
l'n/iticka mi~an, No. 4, 1992. 
Aocl1n, D .. Ewopunn Oomensoon of 1119 Sallwn Cr•~. Pollt. mosao, Vol. XXXII, (1005), No. 5, pp. 147- 160 154 
tunl and cultural tradition of the whole wnrltl, and of resuiLing in a Lib-
e ral-democratic political system as iL' allegedly legitimate superstructun:? 
It is 4uite clear that the Cold war wns a highly cultivoted st ructure of 
relations between the East and the Wt!..\1. lt d isappeared hccause it could 
not fiml an acceptable solution for national identities that had bet:n ~lcri­
ficcd to this idea. StiJI, this culture wa.' capable of causing and pacit)ing 
a number of local wars in line wi1h the intere. t s of the leading powers as 
centers of the international aspirations to establish peace and security. The 
Ralkan war is a typic:.tl syndrome o f lht: crisis of structures of the Cold 
war aud the refore there is u danger of its prcading rapidly a nd nncon-
trnllably. This war looimply does not fit into the old contrul mechanisms. 
lts geographic po ition, brutality, imposstbility to foresee of its leutlcrs 
make this wnr a real puulc for the journalists and even for political sci-
en tists. The threat nf this new reality was noticed quite lai c. Neve rtheless, 
it disclosed all the complexity of the contemporary situa tion in the wurld. 
The disintegration of Yugo Iavin and th~ war which fulluwed should 
nnt only concern lhe cou ntries which have emerged after lbe disintegration 
of former Yugos lavia, but it is al.so a very dramatic beginning o f the re-
gression in whole Europe. Serbia was perfectly aware of thil-. situation and, 
thi is exactly whut encouraged it to stan the war. This war cannot be 
compared Ln any loc<1l war in the Cold war period. It i the first war 
afte r the end of the Cute! wa r era, anti in addition to this, the first r~l 
war in Europe afte r the World War ll. This wnr forced the N/\ TO forces 
to intervene in the a rea th<ll is not in Western Europe. Moreover, it re-
'ultt!d in the fir-st active participation of Gemtany and lta ly in the war 
opera tions in Europe after the World War 11. It also tlisclosed the 
weakne~" of the Western alliances and the American pntgmatism in the 
pe riod of false fri endship betwet:n EngJ::1n.d, France and Germany. The 
war broke nut in the situaliun when the cont rol of great powers over 
Yugo.lavia was weakening. lt was this wc.tkening of control and pressure 
that enabled the local political anti narional antagonisms to emerge. These 
local antagonisms were no t lt~ken toto acc(lunt. and this is why they took 
mnny people by surprise in the war operations which followed. The new 
established structures of political power fo llowing Lhe end of the C'-old war 
fo rmed a procedural vacuum in the relation · between the East and thc 
We. t. Wars prove how the uncontrolled global relations of powers can 
easily turn into the cruelest violence. The failure of tbe Ea..'il and West 
to prevent the outbreak (tf the war, o r at least to stop it quickly once it 
hus t~lready broken out cannot bt: expla ined by eithe r moral ur historic 
arguments. This war broke out because of the procedural vacuum in the 
re la tions between the leatljng European powers which ~taned after the 
end o f the Cold war, and which unfnmmately lasted too long. European 
Union tried to bridge tha t gap, but it only demonstrated utler ingenious-
ness and proved how (utile and olll-fashioned Euwpean political estab-
Lishment was. Ln short. afte r the end nf the Cold war, the re were no 
adequatte political "tructures which could cope witl1 the war in the new 
circumstances. The leading political powers gm lost in the cumplexiry of 
the political events, and all they cou lu do was admit that the Balkan en-
sis has all the qualit ies of '·point of no return". In the dramatic search 
for new actions which would fulfill the poJjtical conditions, they a llowed 
the war to continue for five years. Moreover, tiH.:y did not want any party 
involved in the war to fac.:c e ithe r to ta l defeat o'r victory, hut they con· 
tinued their <;earch for the political ways nf fi nding the peaceful solution 
to the conflict. 
Tt would be totaiJy v•rong to claim Lhat the war in former Yugo. lavia 
broke out incidentaJI~. The Balkan a rea had a p~:ciaJ role in the struc· 
ture of the Cold war, regardless of its internal hi ·torical and political an-
tagoni!.m:.. After the end of the Cold war. Yugoslavia lost its pecial role 
in the sophistic.atcu gnme the leading powers wen.! playing. Suddenly 
Yugoslavia turned into none's hmtl, and all the options were open. What 
fo llowed coult.l be considered a big game involving various scenarios about 
the country's future. It was in such a confusion that the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia started. The multinational country wns not capable of solving 
the crisis hy means of using democratic methods. 
The Balkan war seemed a pu:~..dt: for many people. because they L'Ould 
not estahli"h the internal and external reason'\ fnr the disintegration of 
Yugosla\ia in this bltxllly war. The fact that the analysts tried to establish 
a c.:ausal relationship between the internal and the external factors thlH 
lead to thi~ war did not make this puzzle any e;1sicr to ~olve. The end 
of the Cold war and the lo~ of the role Yugoslavia had in it are in ct 
-;emanLic, not causal relationship towards iL-; intcrual disintegra tion, which 
had started long hcfore the Cold war broke our. As a m;1ller of fact, 
Yugoslavia sta rted to disintegra te immediately after its formation in 1918. 
The country disintegrated as early 11s in 1939, nnd then finnlly in 1941 in 
completely different circnm)o.Lances. Then the country emerged fTom the 
rubble again in 1945, m accordance with the wish of the leading power-. 
and their treaties. and tlms its final disintegration was just postponed to 
take place 45 year-; later. In the present process of di,intt:gmtion of 
Yugoslavia, the West bad taken ll am\al point of view rather than se-
mantic and hermeneutic. The Western Europe W<t , very naive in its belief 
that it could shut ilS mind off the game since it did nat start it in the 
first place, and it seemed really puzzled hy Lhe fact it did not work. In 
the end the miracle batl to happen European !Union had to intervene. 
The Germ::tns reacted by fl1rning to the supreme court to reconsider 
whcther G ermany could take part in the Balkmt war offering logistic sup· 
port. Nowadays they <~re already tlying over Bosnia in their Torn<~dos. The 
s imilar thing happened to the Engli,.h, the French and the Jta lians - the 
Balkan war could not be isolated from the general European reality as 
some JefHving European parties had thought. 
The first years of war in Croatia were extremely dirfiwlt. Reluctance 
of Lhe European forces to intervene either politicaiJy or militarily in the 
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extremely complex situation lead to unbearable moraliz.ing and futile llis-
Cllssions about the situation that cou ld only be labelled as military and 
poJitical. They were relut.:tant to act e ither po litically or militarily. a nd this 
is why they optt:ll for unbearable rhe torics which hardly managed tu con-
ceal their undecisiveness ami incapacity to agree on politicaJ decisions. The 
situation was extremely complex. European Union wa.-; acting without a 
clear political will, while the American initia tive: to establish a m:w world 
order was rather a description of the existing chaos than the way out of 
that chaotic situation. Of course, the worst one can c.Jo in such a s ituation 
is to rnor.t li7e, offer humanit;.1rian, charity and religious support, rather 
than ttct politically and militarily. What was really needed was a s urgilA11 
ilction, n1ther tlum praying. Thjs is ex~ctly whm fimtlly happened. 
1t i. of utmost importance to mention some hi...,turic;.l l momenu. 
.,.. hich lead to the outbreak of war, and to find rca ons why this w.tr is 
so serious tha t it could lead to global disa,te r. Yugoslavia was founded 
nnd inte rnationa lly recngnized by th t:: winners in the World War 1, Eng-
land and France::. The country that emerged 011 the:: rubble of the Otto-
man Empire and Austro-Hung<1rian empire was a country without any co-
hesive centre from the very beginning, and therefme its disinle!,rnttion 
started immediately after its formation. Yugoslavia was a country which 
was fa lling to pieces in a long h.isto rical process, a nd in the e nd it really 
di. in tegrated. This d i ... integratioo process is not only a part of our history, 
it is at the ~me time a part of history or England and France, and or 
course, the whole Europe. The first time Yugoslavia fell to pieces was in 
April 1941, when German troops entered the country. Slovenia was di-
vided betwc::en Italy a nd Germany, wbereas Croatia and Serbia were or-
ganized as separate quisling states. In 1945 Yugoslavia was reconstructed 
h) the winners in the World Wc:tr ll. These countries were not onJy Eng-
land and France, but also Russia and USA. The newly founded Yugosla-
via continued to be a country without democratic legitimate government, 
and in addition to this, a country of clearly divided sovereignty. lt was 
this divided sovereignty of Yugoslavia that made it so different from all 
the other East European count ries.9 This has to be taken into account 
while considering in detail the present crisis. Its divided sovereignty was 
vaguely defined by tht Wc.:ste rn allies and the Soviet Union at the Yalta 
confc.:re nce which LOok place from 4th to 12th f ebnmry 19-l5. 
In 1948, assi ted by Yugo lav Rus ofiJes and Stalinist', Stalin tried ln 
a ttach Yugoslavia to Lhe Eastern hlock. After a serious po litica l crisis 
(which is nowadays too o ften fl(.;glected by po liticians both in C roa tia and 
in the Western world) ami serious threat of a possible major war, it aJI 
ended in a no ther lung period of Cold war. Thi. crisis stabilized the di-
'! Yugoslav self-m.uoagemeot socinlil..m was very different from the Russian real-
Communism in the same way as Spaui!>h fascic;m was different from Germun "Na-
tional-!tocialism. 
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videcl sovereignty of the Yugoslav state. Since that period development of 
Yugoslavia was somewhat peculia!'. Marshal Tito controlled Yugoslavia by 
applying Lhree differen t tactics: firstly, by constantly changing legitimacy of 
his own power; secondly, by maneuvering skillfully between Ius two mas-
ters (the West and the East), and thirdly, by organizing Thin.l wnrlu 
countries to reJjeve his own home policy in the conditions of divided sov-
ereignty and lack of democratic legitimacy. In the anti-Commw1ist 
rhetorics in Croatia the fact that Yugoslavia was essentia l.ly different from 
aU the other c.OUJltries of the Eastern Socialist block is too often ne-
glected and forgotten. Of course:, this is one of the iss11es that will have 
to be discussed once Croatia enters NATO and other Western organiza-
tions. 
When a serious disintegration of the Eastern block started in 1989, the 
West wanted to take revenge on the Soviet Union for 1948, and to join 
Yugoslavia to the system of Western democracies. However, Yugoslavia 
was a rather peculiar case. Ten years after Tito's death, there were 
hardly any chances of keeping a unified state with democratic legitimate 
government. That year, 1989, rnarkt!u Lh t! hegi11ning of the crisis, since all 
the internal antagonisms became obvious. T he Serbs, without reaching con-
sensus with the other nations, started to subm iL all the federal institutions 
to its eon trol. They did not object to the idea that Yugoslavia should join 
the Western democracies, provided it happened under their conLrol anu 
supetv ision. However, Lhis pnweu to he unfeasible since the Serbs could 
not and did not want to democratize Yugoslavia in accordm1ce with the 
Western standards, which was condition the West had set. Tht! Serhs in 
Yugoslavia do not repn:sent national, nor political nor democratic majority 
which would 6e capable of carrying out de.mocratization of the country in 
accordance with the high Western standards. Slovc:nia and Croatia sug-
gested a con feueral organization of the s tate, but the Serbs immediately 
declared it anti-Serbian conspiracy and flatly refused to even consider Lhal 
idea. Proud of its victmy in the Cold war, the Wes t was even willing to 
accept unucmoeratie Yugoslavia, even a fascist one, ruled by the Serbs, 
hoping that one day they could start its democratization by applying eco-
nomic measures and pressures. 
T he fatal, final a ttempt to save Yugoslavia as a unified countty hap-
pene.d during the foreign Secretaty's Baker visit to Belgrade. Since then a 
regressive process leauing Lnwards lhe war started. The Serbs, supported 
by the Russians, explained Daker's words in their own way and plunged 
into the war, the aim of which was to control the whole area of Yugo-
slavia. If they hall achieved it, their plan was to bead for the Eastern or 
the Western influence. Their ain1 was to continue TiLn's polit:y of vacil-
lating between the East and the Wt:st in o rder to enjoy all the advan-
tages of uiviucu sovereignty and definitely s trengthen the Serbian domi-
nance in Yugo!\la.via and the Balkans. They were quite confident that 
nothing couJd happen to them in the blitz-krieg. However, they were 
wrong. By late 1990 a ll ti.Jt:ir plans were alrcauy out of dHte, inadequate 
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for leading any clever pragmatic policy. The internal politic;tl differences 
\vllhin that multinational country were so int~.:m.;fied that nothing cuuld 
stop the disintc&•Tation, no t even the war. This surprised all the Weste rn 
allies, but not the Serbs. Their primitive propaganda ww;; o convincing 
that in the end they !>tartcd believing in it, overrating their pO\ver. After 
70 years of their political dominance iu Yugoslavia, the timt: e<ime when 
Yugoslavia simply had to disintegrate. Croatia iU1d S lovenia were by no 
means the same (acton; as Kosovo and Vojvodina. Pascist frightening of 
people by organi7ing massive meetings had totally contrnry ~ffects. Once 
they S"tarted to realize that they have missed upporllJnity to realize! they 
plans, the war operations became even more radical, leading to uncon-
ceivable hmtalities, genocide, e thnic cleansing, deslmcrion of towns aml 
cities - in short a total war broke out, unprecedented from thc e rn of 
Hi.tler. The war in Slovenia wa. a sort of warning, nbl\olute ly controlled 
by the existing Yu~oslav P\:ople's a rmy, but tl1c war in Croatia, especia lly 
in those areas which the Serbs had planned 10 occupy in cru c Yugu. lavia 
disintegrated, turned out to be a full -.;cale war where all the means were 
acceptable . What followed in Bosnia. intentional creation of chao <md 
r<~cist des truction of the Muslims urgetl the world to partial reaction, 
which, unfortunate ly, became e(fil:ien l as late as in summer 1995. 
Russia was at fin.t holding back, but, of course, no t bc~111 e of irs 
weakness a. the Western cow1tric~ and Croatia believed. The Russiam 
were convinced tha t Yugo,.Javia was a special case, very di(fen.snt from 
Bulgaria and Genmm Democratic Republic, and therefore they pauently 
waited for negotiations. They a llowed the West to demonstrate plurality of 
its interests and to show their internal lack of unity, only tu hlackmail 
them with this uisunity in the negntittlions which took place later. ln 
Croatia Ru~si<m tactics was not discussed too much either; Croa tia blamed 
the French and the Engli h fo r their upport to Serbia. i.e. Yugoslavia. 
Afte r all, Yugo Ia via was their great achievement from 19 J 8. NevertheleJ s, 
the war was not taking the course the Serb~> haci expected, bce<tnse 
Slovenia and Croatia n:sist ed all the ideas abour possibility of formation 
of new Yugoslavia. It was then th<tl I he West rea lizeJ that Yugoslavia as 
a whole wao; lost. Moreover, Russia immediately showed its interest and 
amhition to get a part of the country. Keeping Yugoslavia a unified coun-
oy was Serbian inte rest, as weiJ <t'l inte rest of the We. t, but not Russia's. 
Therefore Weste rn countries soon decided to save what could be saved, 
and, unde r strong German pressure, U1cy quickly recogni7.ed Slovenia anu 
Croatia. No matter how coruplie<1led the events that followed might have 
seemed, they did fo llow a historical logic of forming national identities in 
the a rea. 1\fter Bus nia and Macedonia were recognized, the Russians had 
to throw up the ir cards. They clearly indicated which side they were sup-
porting - ~rbian. T11i" i<; why the Balkan crisis, which many people 
wanted to label a-. 11 tribal civil war, turned mto a 'crious European cri-
sis. Later on, a<; » result of Europe's incompetence to deal with the diffi-
cult situation , it soon turncJ into a global crisis. 
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Everything that has been happening after this was finally rea lized, is 
part of a poUtical and military process which wanted to apply the divided 
soven::ignty of Yugoslavia agreed in Yalta on the !:,'TOund. Of course, this 
division was not done according to geomettic logic. of the leading powers 
50-50 %, but according to the situation on the ground determined by 
the will of natinnal iuentilics. It still remains to he seen how lhe five 
new Balkan countries will be orientated politically - it is still considered 
a q uasi-open question, because in that case the Russians can110t complain 
that they have been tricked and outwitted. There is ~;till a chance of the 
Russians losing Serbia, as well as the open possibility of their seti ous en-
gagement in Bosnia. Under such circumstances the Serbs are fighting Hs-
sisted by the Russians against the Western lack of unity in assessing the 
s ituation. They are objecting against the historical status quo of the for-
mer Yugoslav territories. The ultimate goal is formation of Great Serbia 
fo r the account of Bosn ian and Croatian territo1y. In this final critical 
phase of the war, the West <.tllnws furtlter Jestrudinn anu even massive 
migrations of people in order to reconsider its own interests as well as 
the Russian readiness for further cooperation in this serious case of war. 
At this existe ntially difficult moment when we are witnessing fragility of 
world peace, political ly discredited Europe is facing real danger that tbe 
Russians mighl enter the internal hnruers of Ccnlral Europe and the 
Mediterranean, which seemed quite unfeasible just a short time ago. Un-
der such circumstances, the world poucy, lead by USA, decided to prag-
matie<~lly simplify the com plex situation by offering different options. There 
are four possibilities, and the USA is prepared to accept all the four op-
tions, depem.ling on the further J evelopmenl of lhe situation on the 
ground: Firstly, the Russian-Americ..an agreement to preserve the territoria l 
and political status quo of the former Yugoslav republics under their close 
supe1vision. Secondly, there is a possibility of establishing lhe Western 
military territorial status quo without any i.nteiVention from the Russian 
part. Thirdly, there is a possibility that the war might spread to the 
whole area of Balkans, anu thus prmlm;e such threat to the world peace 
which is presently impossible to anticipate; and finaJiy, there is a possibiJ-
ity o f tenitorial division of Bosnia and Hercegovina into tlm:e national 
entities, wbich woulu he unucr close supervision o r the long-standing pro-
tectorship of the United Nations or the leading powers. Of course, there 
are also different combinations of these possibiliti~::s. The World War is 
presently jusl one of the Yeltsin's rhetoric threats, but nevertheless, it 
speaks for itself about the c.urrent situation we are facing u1 the middle 
of Europe. 
ll is very risky to predict the development of wars and world politics, 
but one thing is quite sure: The war in the Balkans has reached a his-
torical point which is marking an era very different from the situation 
Lluring the World War II and the Cold war period which fo llowed. This 
unexpected war that took many people by surprise marks the beginning of 
the uncertain future. There is no doubt that Europe has once again 
shown tl1at it · role in world politics is second-ra te. The die is cast! Tht! 
b~.:ginning of lhe next millennium is certainly not going to be as idyllic as 
the European poliliciaos and a large number of analy:.t' bad thought. 
Translated by 
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